On the Revocation of Pardons
"Experts said they knew of no other instance in which a presidential pardon had been revoked. They said it was not clear whether Bush was legally allowed to do so." - Chicago Tribune, December 25, 2008
One can hardly blame the Tribune for printing this statement. Lord knows countless other news agencies are doing the same thing today. There were deadlines to meet. There are plenty of people willing to talk about pardons, and even more willing to talk about the president! But there are very few people who have actually researched and written on the pardon power and deserve the title "expert." My forthcoming book dedicates considerable space to the topic of pardons that have been revoked. Here are just a few notes to share on the topic. This is not the appropriate forum to be comprehensive:
Ulysses S. Grant's first clemency decision, on his third day in office, was to revoke two pardons granted by Andrew Johnson. Both men challenged Grant's power to do so, and lost their case in federal court. A central passage in a judicial opinion read:If the president can arrest the mission of the messenger went the messenger has departed but ten feet from the door of the presidential mansion, he can arrest such mission at any time before the messenger delivers the pardon to the warden of the prison.The fact that "the president" - in this case - meant two different presidents (Johnson and Grant), and the fact that - in this case - the warden had actually received the pardons but simply stuck them in his desk for a while, did not matter. The pardons had not actually been placed in the hands of Moses and Jacob DePuy, so the two men stayed in prison and were pardoned (by Grant) later.
Grant also revoked the pardon of James F. Martin, but the New York Times, reported that the official order from the State Department reached the U.S. Marshal in Massachusetts "too late." That is to say, Martin had accepted his pardon and had exited the premises. No effort was made to put him back.
Finally Grant revoked the pardon of Richard C. Enright, who was sentenced to 18 months in prison and fined $2,500 for conspiracy to defraud the government. Johnson granted a full pardon 12 months into the sentence but, before the pardon could reach Enright's hands, Grant revoked it. Enright had to cool his heels another 8 months.
In a 1975 article for Case and Commentary, distinguished attorney Melvin H. Belli referred to an instance in 1969 when the President "managed to head off a pardon granted by the previous President." According to Belli, a telegram was sent to "waylay" the pardon "just before it was delivered into the hands of the intended receivers."Of course, in 2001, there was some speculation that President Bush might revoke the pardon of Marc Rich. To be sure, behind the scenes, there was some consideration of precedent and case law that emerged during the Grant administration. But, in 2001, there was a different mindset about the importance of receiving a pardon. Which is to say, the importance of receiving a pardon was no longer considered a critical factor in assessing its validity (Henry Flipper did not receive his pardon. He was dead). While this approach certainly has its logic, it does raise the interesting question: where does the life of a pardon begin? Bush might argue that no individual clemency warrant was signed for Isaac Robert Toussie. Critics may say the appearance of Toussie's name on a "master warrant" is enough. It may simply take the President saying, "Toussie is pardoned." The problem is that there is a clear void where a theory once hung around.
Can George Bush revoke the pardon of Mr. Toussie? There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever, in my mind, that he can - "can" here means, he can do it and withstand a legal challenge.
Should George Bush revoke his own pardon? Probably not. Instead of using this fisasco as a chance to throw mud at people below him, Bush should instead use it as an opportunity to recognize that, when presidents are stingy with pardons and leave thousands of applicants high and dry, wealth, influence and access are much more likely to wiggle their way through the cracks and infect clemency decisions.
The solution is to staff and fund the Office of the Pardon Attorney more generously and grant more pardons on a regular basis, encouraging the idea that applications will receive a fair shake and reducing perceptions that one has to end-round the process to have even the proverbial snowball's chance.
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12 Comments:
I'd like to know why there's "no doubt" that Bush can revoke the pardon in a manner that withstands judicial review. If Dupuy is the relevant precedent than, sure, the individual warrant was never received. But back in 2001, during the kerfuffle over Rich, a number of experts expressed the opinion that a pardon becomes valid at the moment the president pronounces it. Love said as much in testimony before the House, and no one challenged her on it. She based her claim on Biddle arguing that it superseded the Dupuy precedent, disposing of the need for actual delivery. I can't think of any Constitutional reason why an enumerated power exercised by the President should require the ratification of a subordinate to become operative.
So what are you really saying here? That the courts, being deferential to executive authority in regard to pardons, will let Mr. Bush do as he pleases? That Love and others were just plain crazy back in 2001?
Toussie hasn't the faintest prayer of being pardoned by Obama; it's almost inconceivable that Bush will again reverse himself and 'reinstate' his original pardon. His family possesses abundant resources. They have every incentive to litigate this question, and the wherewithal to take it to SCOTUS. And, given the ambiguity in established precedent, it's precisely the sort of case that the Court generally accepts. And if it does, it's going to have a mess on its hands. To insist that a pardon must be delivered, it would have to overturn Biddle. To rule that the president's signature is insufficient is to raise some serious constitutional issues. My best bet would be that the court would actually uphold the original pardon - ironically, being deferential of executive authority in this case means overruling the President.
Thanks for the interesting information.
I know little about the pardon power, so when I read the news story about this week's "revocation," my first thought was, "cool! so, if Bush pardons Cheney and himself, can Obama revoke the pardon?"
(Whether he would is a whole 'nother story.)
So, just reasoning it out without real research, I'm guessing no and yes.
Specifically, I don't see any way to revoke an already effective pardon for a pre-existing conviction. (Your questions as to whether a pardon may sometimes be effective even before delivery don't affect this question.) Once an unconditional pardon has become effective, the state (in this case, the U.S.) has no further right to hold that person, any more than if the person had served a full prison sentence. A 'revocation' at that point would be like retroactively extending the sentence. Habeas corpus would be a no-brainer.
But the pardon itself is not what stops the state at that point from re-trying the guy. The problem there is double jeopardy. He went through it once, can't happen again.
When the pardon is pre-emptive, however, double jeopardy does not apply. The pardon would truly take effect only after there is a conviction. So it can be revoked before that time by the executive. And if the executive has changed hands in the interim, so what? Legally, the entity is the same.
Maybe something in the Supreme Court's reasoning upholding preemptive pardons rules this approach out? What do you think?
EDITOR:Thank you for your thoughts on this, Anon. I don't consider my post a legal analysis so much as I consider it a historical one - the central question being, "Have presidents revoked pardons in the past?" So, I am not arguing the DePuy pardons constitute legal precedent, so much as I see them (and at least three other examples) as noteworthy flags regarding past practice.
Likewise, I did not intend to "defend" the delivery rule so much as I intended to explain it so readers could understand what happened in the five examples discussed. I think I also did explicitly note that the contrary view has its logic.
But while we are tossing delivery theory out of the window, I thought I might ask your thoughts about this: A while back George Lardner of the Washington Post wrote an editorial in which he argued Supreme Court "precedent" mandated that acceptance of a pardon implied guilt. Do you agree with his postion? So, by your position, a president can pardon someone, and their acceptance of the pardon is irrelevent, and guilt is implied in an official manner. Correct?
In answer to your rhetorical question, yes, I do believe that anyone who testifies before a House committee is "just plain crazy" :-)
I would, of course, LOVE to see this all litigated, but I am not so comfortable suggesting the Supreme Court is anxious to take cases regarding the pardon power. To say that courts have generally let presidents do what they please - in regard to pardons - is not very far off the mark at all. Best,
Thanks for your response.
I would suggest that Lardner has a bit of a burr under his saddle. His interest in pardons stems from the Rich debacle, which he covered as a reporter, and which left him justifiably outraged. Most of his views seem to trace back to that single incident. He has, moreover, a penchant for reaching back to the distant past for historical precedent to illustrate his preferred arguments, without regard for whether the law has evolved since his chosen examples. So Lardner cites Wilson (1833) and Burdick (1915) to make his point about the acceptance of guilt, but somehow neglects to mention Biddle (1925) or Schick (1974), both of which undermined the need for acceptance.
But the key objection I would raise is to the equation of pardoning with a finding of guilt. Presidents have routinely used the pardon power to extend clemency to individuals precisely because they do not believe them to have been guilty of the crimes of which they were convicted. The posthumous pardon of Henry Flipper is but one recent prominent example; others abound. Accepting such a pardon cannot possibly be equated with an admission of guilt; in fact, it might better be seen as a ratification, by the executive, of innocence.
Is the Court generally deferential? Absolutely. I'm sure it isn't eager to get involved. But it's worth bearing in mind that the court has, in the past, almost always involved itself when the issue in the case is the legitimacy of a pardon, as opposed to the scope or nature of the privilege. So if I were to file suit claiming the President had improperly granted a pardon, I'm sure the courts would find that I lacked standing, or use some other purely procedural means of dodging the issue. But a suit claiming that a pardon was legitimate almost has to be accepted by the court, because the rights and freedom of an individual are at stake, and there's no other means of resolving the issue. In those circumstances, the Court has, in the past, reluctantly stepped in. And I have no doubt that the next milestone ruling on the pardon power will be Toussie.
Unfoutunately, the Bush-Cheney administration is a boat that has lost it's Constitutional mooring.
The United States Constitution, authorizing our national government, only allows for granting pardons by the President. Our national Constitution does not allow un-granting pardons by the President.
Constitutional impeachment, Nancy Pelosi's eternal boogieman, remains the corrective force to America's winds of fate.
I have to point out that the reason that the "pardon as an admission of guilt" question arose is that (based on another Supreme Court case) individuals have the right to refuse a pardon, and the plaintiff in that case successfully argued that acceptance of a pardon is tantemount to an admission of guilt (because he argued that a pardon is considered an excusal, rather than an exoneration for past deeds). Indeed, the whole idea of a "preemptive pardon" presupposes the idea that one will commit a crime in the future (or be tried for one) and it is impossible to argue that one is innocent of a crime that has not been committed, and difficult to argue that one is innocent of a crime that has not been tried. Therefore, this supports the idea (which I believe has its roots in English law and the very name of "pardon") that it is an excusal for a misdeeds (past or future), and not a statement of innocence. I also believe the public perception of pardons supports the idea of an excusal - does anyone really think that Marc Rick was really innocent of the crimes he was accused?
Also, if a pardon can be granted posthumously, does that not invalidate the argument that a pardon has to be delivered to become effective?
Thanks and kudos to you, Ruckman and the ethereal Anonymous ( I suppose the legal equivalent of the martial Cincinnatus). I am very keen to see this outrageous act of revocation reversed. A Stanford Law Review article of 1987by Jeremy Rabkin and Neal Devins is instructive. They assert that the pardon is an "unbreakable contract with the recipient.." As such surely Mr. Toussie is protected even from the political nonsense following the pardon being announced. Keep up the good work and perhaps Anonymous can comment on Schick v. Reed in this context. I regret I don't have the energy to properly cite the Rabkin and Devins article, Averting Government by Consent Decree..
I appreciated the fact that you made reference to some actual cases in your post, unlike most comments I've seen on this topic. However, I think you placed too much emphasis on the "delivery" issue, which I think misses the real point: there are no limits on the power to pardon, but what about the power to revoke? A related issue- which will undoubtedly arise in the coming months- does President Obama have the power to revoke Bush's pardons? Does it make a difference whether the "revoking" President is the same as the "granting" President? If so, why? Let me posit the following scenario: On his last full day in office, Bush pardons Joe Blow for various crimes. Bush signs the pardon, and dispatches a courier to Blow's house to deliver it personally. The courier hands the pardon over to Blow, who then issues a press release stating that he has received and does "accept" the pardon (OK- I admit it- I'm doing my best to avoid the non-outcome determinative issues that I think clouded your original post and followup). The next day, Obama, at his inaugural address, states that the top priority of his admibnstration will be to review the pardon of Blow. Somewhat later, Obama holds a press conference to announce that he is revoking Blow's pardon. Blow promptly files suit in federal court, claiming various violations of his rights, etc. The case evntually reaches the Supreme Court. Any thoughts as to the outcome? Ron Smith
EDITOR:I can conceive of a situation where Joe Blow's pardon could be revoked, yes. Will elaborate in a future post. Again, I want to emphasize to all that the delivery/reception idea is not mine and I am not to be considered its defender. To a large extent, I am uncomfortable with it because it can then be linked with the idea that accepting a pardon implies guilt - which I think is quite wrong headed. I argued against the Lardner take on Libby as soon as the Post editorial landed. Best,
I read a report that what Bush had actually done as to all 19 people was to issue an order directing the Pardon Attorney/Dept. of Justice to begin the ministerial steps of preparing the pardon documents. If that report is accurate, then the reports saying that Bush had (past tense) "pardoned" the 19 people are erroneous (I don't fault the reporters; perhaps the Bush Admin. press people were confused).
I was one of the lawyers who persuaded Clinton to issue the posthumous pardon to Lt. Flipper; our legal brief on the "delivery" rule and posthumous pardons was published in the Indiana Law Journal. The basic problem with the "delivery" rule is that it is not part of the British Royal pardon power as it stood in 1789, and that is the power that the Constitution brought into the hands of the President. There is also a practical problem with it: suppose that a President pardons someone in federal prison, but the convict, who has always maintained his innocence, refuses it because of a belief that to accept a pardon is to admit guilt. Must the prison continue to house and feed the prisoner against the will of the President?
It seems to me that any pardon secured on the basis of fraud or bribery could be revoked at any time, by any person holding the office with the power of pardon.
It appears to me that what Bush is doing is revoking the pardon because of the applicant's attempt to set up a bribe.
But, someone has said, that contribution was made by the father, not the son.
My guess is that Bush checked with his lawyers who told him that it doesn't matter who pays the bribe, or if the bribe is unknown to the beneficiary, or even if the bribe is unknown to the person granting the pardon - the mere attempt at bribery undercuts the appearance of impartiality necessary to the effectiveness of the act, and therefore may be a basis for a revocation.
Supposing that to be the rationale, what are the chances that any court will say him nay?
None, in my opinion.
If it helps at all, our United States Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court, with all other courts being subsidiary to the Supreme Court. One asks the Supreme Court to determine if the President has been bribed within the indictment of impeachment.
A crime done in high office, or even a fifty dollar misdemeanor, elevates the next high-office holder to that elevated office by means of impeachment.
Our national Constitution authorizes only honest government.
http://google.com/books?q=pardons-except-in-cases-of-impeachment-is-unlimited
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